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Is the Viable System Model of organization inimical to the concept of human 
freedom? 
 
Final Version of a Paper published in Journal of Organizational Transformation and 
Social Change. 3(1): pp69-83. 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the sensitivity of Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model of 
organization to the concept of human freedom. The paper notes the many critics who 
have suggested that the Viable System Model is inimical to human freedom and their 
especial reference to its application to the social economy of Chile in the early 1970s. 
Drawing on the work of philosophers, a conceptual analysis of freedom is provided 
that suggests a complex ordinary language usage of the term. At least three 
determinants of freedom, that are logically independent of one another, are identified 
as being of relevance to its ordinary usage. The paper finds that these determinants are 
implicitly addressed and acknowledged within Beer’s own writings, but that they are 
ignored by the critics of the Viable System Model and that this makes for a lack of 
clarity and precision in the debate. The paper also applies a further criterion, 
formulated in political philosophy, to judge whether the leadership of the government 
that applied the Viable System Model to the Chilean social economy was itself hostile 
to political freedom or democracy. This application of the criterion suggests that they 
were not. 
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Introduction 
Stafford Beer’s books on the managerial cybernetics of organization often carried 
paradoxical or oxymoronic titles. Is there any argument that is ‘Beyond Dispute’ 
(Beer 1994a)? How can ‘Designing Freedom’ be a sensible pursuit (Beer 1974)? 
What has a business manager to learn from being asked ‘How Many Grapes Went 
into the Wine?’ (Beer 1994b)? No doubt these titles were intended to challenge the 
would-be reader into finding out more but they also provide a subtle hint towards the 
dilemmas that might face management cybernetics itself: a science of communication 
and control must be deployed with great sensitivity if it is not to be used to deny 
human freedom. 
In this article, I note Beer’s development of a managerial cybernetics of organization 
and focus on its most famous component – the Viable System Model of organization. 
This is followed by a brief review of the many critics who have suggested that the 
Viable System Model of organization is inimical to human freedom. In this regard, a 
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special reference is made to the application of the model to the social economy of 
Chile in the early 1970s. I propose that ‘freedom’ is an elusive concept and seek to 
bring some precision and clarity to this discussion by relating it to the ideas of two 
philosophers: Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer. Three determinants of freedom are 
thereby identified and these are used to identify the sensitivity of Beer’s managerial 
cybernetics to the concept of freedom. Finally, the political philosophy of K. R. 
Popper is used to pass a judgement on the merits of making the Viable System Model 
available, as a management tool, to the Chilean government of that era. 
The managerial cybernetics of organization 
It is forty years since Stafford Beer wrote Decision and Control – a book on how 
science might be invoked to solve problems of decision and control in management 
(Beer 1966). The modelling epistemology that the book detailed was further 
developed in a series of subsequent books and, as a result, a new approach to the 
practice of management studies was established – what Beer came to call ‘the 
managerial cybernetics of organization’ (Beer 1979, 1981, 1985, 1994a) 1. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to detail in full the content of these writings and I 
intend to assume, for the most part, that the reader is reasonably familiar with this 
corpus. As such, they will know that an important aspect of Beer’s life project was an 
investigation into ‘how systems are viable – that is capable of independent existence’ 
(Beer 1989: 11). 
Decision and Control briefly presented a model that sought to account for the nature 
of neuro-physiological control in the human body (Beer 1966). The structural 
principles and relationships thereby discovered were briefly mapped onto the structure 
                                                 
1Beer used the generic sub-heading ‘The managerial cybernetics of organization’ in 
the title of many of his books. For an overview see Beer (2000). 
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of a firm. The model, which came to be called the ‘Viable System Model’ or ‘VSM’, 
was further developed in a subsequent book – Brain of the Firm (Beer 1972). In 1979, 
Beer authored a companion volume to ‘Brain of the Firm’. This work, The Heart of 
Enterprise, was a lengthy treatise that attempted to deduce, by other means, the same 
principles and relationships of management and organization that were presented in 
the earlier neuro-physiological model (Beer 1979). The book deploys aprioristic 
reasoning and logical argument and illustrates its propositions with Platonic style 
dialogues between imaginary managers. In 1985, a third volume, Diagnosing the 
System for Organizations, completed Beer’s explanation of the VSM (Beer 1985). 
This book, written in the format of a workbook, was designed to assist in the 
diagnostic application of the model to an organization selected by the reader. 
However, unlike the previous works, it presented the VSM by using iconographic 
models to precisely represent the structural relationships and communication channels 
identified in the earlier work.  
In 1971, Beer was invited to apply the VSM to the organization and regulation of the 
Chilean economy – project ‘Cybersyn’ as it was called by the then Chilean 
government. A second edition of ‘Brain of the Firm’ includes an account of this 
project, its mixed success, and the lead up to the military coup that deposed the 
project’s sponsor – the Unidad Popular coalition government led by President 
Salvador Allende (Beer 1981). 
The Viable System Model of organization 
Holism is a defining mark of Beer’s managerial cybernetics (Beer 1966). 
Management cybernetics always stresses the special properties or aspects of 
phenomena that make such phenomena appear as an organized structure, rather than a 
mere heap. The word ‘viable’ is a technical term in embryology: it means ‘capable of 
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independent existence’ (Beer 1989: 11). For Beer, the VSM represented the invariant 
characteristics of a particular class of holistic systems: 
…all the systems that interested me, whether in industry or computing or biology, 
had in common the difficulty of understanding the role of autonomy. This was the 
notion that I set out to investigate at the beginning of the 1950s. (Beer 2001: 2)
 
Beer’s model of how systems are viable, that is how they are capable of independent 
existence, defies compression because of its complexity, but it represents the class as 
exhibiting a particular pattern of organization. This pattern is self-sustained because it 
involves five subsystems of interactive loops operating within a changing, but 
potentially supportive environment. The five subsystems of any viable system interact 
in a way that regulates the ‘variety’ of that defined system; variety being the states of 
the system relevant to the conventional criteria that are used to identify the system 
under investigation. Only an observer
.
 can define such criteria. 
One subsystem consists of the set of activities that implement the identity of the 
viable system. But by definition, such activities need to be constrained if they are not 
to destabilize the identity of the system in focus. Similarly, such activities may need 
to be adapted if the system is to evolve in a way that is compatible with continuous 
survival. In the model, this means, amongst many other things, that the other four 
subsystems must embody a higher order logic that acts to constrain the 
implementation subsystem, whenever its unhindered component actions would 
undermine the coherence of the whole system. In the terminology of the model, they 
act as a ‘meta-system’: 
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The meta system must make some intervention, and should make only that degree 
of intervention that is required to maintain cohesiveness in a viable system. (Beer 
1979: 158) 
Moreover, the model proposes that viable systems are recursively organized – they are 
contained within themselves much like a set of Russian dolls. One of the five 
subsystems – the implementation system – is necessarily a set of viable systems itself. 
Hence, what would be perceived to constitute a meta-system at one recursive level of 
interest is perceived to constitute a part of an implementation system at another 
recursive level of interest. 
This rudimentary account of the model indicates that, given an interest in the viability 
of a specified system, questions of freedom and constraint may be conceptualized as 
questions of logic:  
As long as oppression and freedom are seen solely as normative values, the 
outcome is determined by self-interest. Then we get polarization, and people will 
fight to the death for a prospect which is in either case not viable. But if we raise 
our eyes to the higher level of the total system in designing … controls, and use the 
viability criterion as the balance point, liberty must be a computable function of 
effectiveness for any total system whose objectives are known. (Beer 1975b: 428) 
For Beer, this means that from a modelling perspective: 
Freedom is in principle a computable function of systemic purpose as perceived. 
That is the explosive conclusion. It is explosive precisely because it sounds 
heartless, whereas the dear question of freedom is full of heart. The trouble seems 
to be that people do not like to believe that any matter of passion for them could 
 - 7 - 
possibly be bound by scientific rules, forgetting that the passion itself is limited by 
the rules of their own physiological capability to endure it. (Beer 1979: 158) 
Some critical commentaries on managerial cybernetics 
The first chapter of ‘Decision and Control’ opened with a section that was entitled 
‘How to Neutralize a Revolution’. It invoked Machiavelli’s advice on how to 
condemn those who question an existing order: ‘the basic technique is to pretend that 
they do not exist’ (Beer 1966: 3–4). These words seem rather prophetic some forty 
years later, for it would appear that very few management scholars have seriously 
grappled with Beer’s writings and his approach to organizational studies rarely 
features in books on that subject. 
One reason for this may reside in the fact that the VSM and its application in Chile 
attracted a not inconsiderable number of critical, and sometimes polemical, 
commentaries (Adams 1973; Rivett 1977; Brissy 1989; Checkland 1980; Ulrich 
1981). 
Whilst these critics develop their arguments to a greater or lesser degree, and whilst 
they take their arguments in different directions, a central thrust to their criticisms is 
that the VSM, as a putative model of social organization, is inimical to human 
freedom. I will offer only a brief outline of each critic’s perspective for present 
purposes. 
John Adams (1973) offered his trenchant criticisms by reviewing a public lecture, 
entitled ‘Fanfare for Effective Freedom‘, that was delivered by Stafford Beer in 1973 
(Beer 1975b). In the lecture, Beer described his application of the VSM to the entire 
social economy of Chile. Adams observed that: 
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His cybernetic model of any viable system, currently being put into working order 
for President Allende of Chile, is a fully elaborated and computerized model of a 
tyranny.… It works for the worker and the minister in the same way that it works 
for a dog and his trainer, a private and his general, a slave and his master. Its 
function is control. (Adams 1973: 4) 
In the lecture Beer offered a cybernetic analysis of the: 
 
 … possibility that it is open to mankind at least to compute a set or organizational 
structures that would suit the needs of actual men – as being at once themselves 
independent viable systems with a right of individual choice, and also members of 
a coherent society which in turn has a right of collective choice. (Beer 1975b: 428) 
Beer’s analysis led him to conclude that: ‘… liberty must be computable function of 
effectiveness for any system whose objectives are known’ (Beer 1975b: 428). 
In response, Adams observed that: 
For purposes of explaining this to the workers we can reduce the relationship to the 
slogan Liberty is Control [original emphasis]. It has a rhythm that lends itself 
readily to chanting along with other Newspeak slogans such as War is Peace, 
Might is Right, Square is Round, etc. (Adams 1973: 4–5) 
In his review, Adams proceeded to summarize the neuro-physiological basis of the 
model that Beer had detailed in his book ‘Brain of the Firm’ (Beer 1981). Adams 
allied the model to the behavioural technologies championed by the psychologist B. F. 
Skinner: 
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Those who have been induced by their culture to act to further its survival through 
design must accept the fact that they are altering the conditions under which men 
live and hence, engaging in the control of human behaviour. Good government is 
as much a matter of the control of human behaviour as bad… (Skinner cited in 
Adams 1973: 6) 
Adams concluded that: 
… the present crisis in Chile is precisely about who has been induced, to use 
Skinner’s euphemism, to control Chile. Professor Beer is offering one of the 
contenders for the honour of controller a tool for greatly strengthening its 
control.… But this is a problem only if there is a dispute about objectives and this 
seems to strike Professor Beer and President Allende as a remote possibility.… the 
sort of confusion to which those in power seem to be prone. It is Louis XIV who is 
generally credited with having transformed the confusion into a political principle. 
This principle is enunciated succinctly as l’etat c’est moi [original emphasis].2 
(Adams 1973: 5) 
The thrust of Adams critique has been repeated by others. Jacques Brissy represents 
Beer as a writer who moves ‘from analogy to model to utopia’ (Brissy 1989: 228). 
Patrick Rivett, in a critique of Beer’s approach, asks ‘Who controls the controller?’ 
(Rivett 1977: 36). 
Similarly, a book reviewer of Beer’s axiomatic exposition of the VSM in ‘The Heart 
of Enterprise’, found it to be: 
                                                 
2
 ‘L’etat c’est moi’ translates to “The state – it is me”. 
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Inadequately referenced and uncritical throughout of its own assumptions, the book 
assumes rather than argues its position. And the book’s position needs to be argued 
very carefully because it offers us the prospect, if the model were taken too 
seriously, of a negative utopia in which operational units, which the author would 
dearly like to call autonomous, are in fact allowed only that degree of freedom 
which is ‘compatible with systemic cohesion’. Since the system is monolithically 
defined, that is a prospect which ought to scare us. (Checkland 1980: 423) 
A philosophical spin to the charge that the VSM is inimical to human freedom was 
provided by Werner Ulrich’s critique (1981) of the application of the VSM in Chile – 
project ‘Cybersyn’. Ulrich argued that the VSM represented an exercise of theoretical 
reason in the Kantian sense: ‘it produces explanation of what is’ (Ulrich 1981: 33). 
Ulrich contrasted this with Kant’s notion of practical reason: ‘Reason is practical in 
the Kantian sense if it gives us cognitive guidance in practical action and design of 
what ought to be’ (Ulrich 1981: 33). Ulrich found the VSM to be lacking in a number 
of key criteria that were, for him, required of any ‘systems paradigm’ that supported 
the exercise of practical reason. Chief amongst these was the criteria of ‘intrinsic 
control versus intrinsic motivation’ (Ulrich 1981: 34).  
In relation to this, Ulrich defined intrinsic control as ‘the capability of a system, 
independently of an external controller … to maintain its stability … across a range of 
environmental or internal variations’ (Ulrich 1981: 34). In contrast, intrinsic 
motivation was defined as ‘internal autonomy and responsibility for choice’ (Ulrich 
1981: 34). 
In applying these criteria to the VSM, as a model of a social organization, Ulrich 
contended that the ideal of viability is ‘one of intrinsic control, but extrinsic 
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motivation’ (Ulrich 1981: 43). In short, Ulrich argued that the ‘source of 
purposefulness’ is unconsidered by the VSM representation of social organization. 
Consequently, the VSM offered nothing to assist self-reflective humans choose their 
goals.   
These findings led Ulrich to classify the VSM as an example of ‘Scientistic 
thinking… characterized by its preoccupation with theoretical reason and its 
disavowal of the very possibility of practical reason’ (Ulrich 1981: 33). The charge 
that the Chilean application of the VSM had the potential to suppress human freedom 
was once more levelled: 
Cybersyn’s built in purpose thus appears to be a one-sided efficiency of 
production. With respect to this purpose, it may indeed help the workers maximize 
their effectiveness.… But this reflects mere tool design that does not consider its 
own normative content, the missed opportunity for true democratisation of the 
workplace … the workers are ‘helped’ to be better tools of industrial production; 
that is all. True, the overall political purpose of improved productivity was 
democratic socialism. The tool, unfortunately, is closer to… managerial fascism. 
(Ulrich 1981: 54–55) 
The concept of freedom 
Freedom is an elusive concept. One problem is that whenever people talk of 
something as ‘free’ there is no clarity to their expression unless they also say what it 
is free from. Consider: ‘I am free’. But am I free from the necessity to eat? Am I free 
to do whatever takes my fancy – no matter what the effect that my action has upon 
others? It is only in a most abstract sense that freedom means the complete absence of 
external obstacles to the realization of the will and its desires. 
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What tends to follow from this is that those who seek to chase down the meaning of 
freedom tend to run past one another. In 1979, Stafford Beer thought that ‘freedom’ 
was perhaps ‘…the most emotive word that could be written at the head of any page’ 
(Beer 1979: 145). Such emotion makes people run all the harder. It follows that 
freedom can only be rationally discussed if discussants surrender some of theirs: they 
must adopt some standards of precision and clarity in the way that relevant concepts 
are to be used. The precision and clarity that is perhaps required can be found in the 
writings of philosophers. 
The classical liberal conception of freedom is that it represents liberty from; the 
absence of interference and obstruction (Berlin 1969). This was the stance of the 
utilitarian philosophers who believed that human happiness is best promoted by 
freedom to do as one pleases. Yet they also realized that such freedom could not be 
unlimited, because if it was, then the freedom of one might be exercised at the 
expense of another: 
… men should be free to act upon their opinions – to carry these out in their lives, 
without hindrance, either physical or moral from their fellow-men, so long as it is 
at their own risk or peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. (Mill 1962: 
184) 
Where does the authority of society begin and the authority of the individual end? For 
J. S. Mill: 
Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly 
concerns it.… As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the 
interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the 
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general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to 
discussion. (Mill 1962: 205) 
The liberal notion of freedom is concerned with the ability to control – the origin of 
will and desire is of no concern. This contrasts with more authoritarian views of 
freedom. For other philosophers have asked whether freedom is ‘true’ freedom if it is 
exercised as a mere slave to passions (Plato), or as a product of a false consciousness 
of real interests (Marx), or if it selfishly ignores the interests of the tribe or state (Plato 
and Hegel). But such theorizing results in a gross departure from the ordinary usage of 
the concept of freedom and it has been widely criticized for the horrors in which it 
results (Russell 1928; Koestler 1955; Popper 1957, 1966; Ayer 1990). For as Bertrand 
Russell remarked: ‘Hegel and his followers think that “true” freedom consists in the 
right to obey the police’ (Russell 1928: 169). 
Yet there remains something deeply unsatisfactory about the liberal conception of 
freedom, even when its provisos and qualifications are emphasized. The reasons for 
this are neatly summarized by Ayer: 
… it takes no account of the factors that govern a man’s choice. It is of course, 
open to anyone to decide to use the word freedom so that its application depends 
only upon the occurrence of a process of choice, irrespective of the way that the 
choice is determined. But in the first place, this would not be in accordance with 
customary usage, which requires that, at least in some cases, a restriction of the 
field of choice should be regarded as a limitation of freedom. And secondly, it 
would fail to bring out the actual complexity of the political problem. For the 
practical aim of those who represent themselves as advocates of political freedom 
is not merely to remove the hindrances which prevent men from doing what they 
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choose, but also to transform the factors which limit and pervert the nature of their 
choice. (Ayer 1990: 136) 
One concept that can bring the complexity of the discussion to the fore is the 
mathematical idea of a ‘spielraum’. In his essay on The Concept of Freedom, Ayer 
offered this metaphor of a ‘playing-space’ as a means for assessing a man’s freedom: 
In connection with the judgements which we make about freedom, this metaphor 
of a playing-space can be applied in three ways. For our assessment of a man’s 
freedom may be held to depend first upon the degree to which his spielraum 
[original emphasis] is encumbered, secondly upon its extent and thirdly upon the 
manner in which its boundaries are fixed. These three criteria are logically 
independent of one another, and do not always reveal a similar result when they are 
severally applied to a given case. There appears, however, to be no established rule 
for giving any one of them the preference over the others in the case where they 
conflict. (Ayer 1990: 139) 
In ‘Decision and Control’, Beer referred to how the solution to a mathematical 
problem may be contained by a particular phase space. Consider Beer’s example of a 
friend who lives in a Southerly direction from his own house in England. The friend 
lives not further West than South West and not further East than South East. These 
conditions have set a phase space for the solution to the problem; they have limited 
the problem of finding the house to that of taking only 90 of the 360 possible search 
bearings. Similarly, applying Ayer’s metaphor to this description, offers an almost 
unlimited, unencumbered spielraum in which the friend can choose to live. As of yet, 
there is no reason to discount any location within the spielraum. For instance, there is 
no reason to discount rivers or lakes. But if we are told that the friend’s house cannot 
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be a houseboat then some such locations can be discounted – his spielraum is 
encumbered. Similarly, there are, as of yet, no limits as to how far Southward the 
friend is free to live. But, if we are told that the friend also lives in England then such 
a limit to the spielraum will apply. 
Hence, if we take freedom to mean not only the absence of external obstacles to the 
realization of the will and its desires, but also the ability to govern the range over 
which the will and its desires may be exercised, then using the notion of spielraum we 
might focus attention on what might be called the three ‘determinants of freedom’: 
1. The first determinant is the power to overcome environmental obstacles to 
self-determination within the given spielraum. 
2. The second relates to the extent of the spielraum in which such self-
determination may be exercised. 
3. The third relates to whomever or whatever determines the limits of the 
spielraum. 
Is it possible to use the concept of a ‘spielraum’ and the three determinants of freedom 
to illuminate the sensitivity of Stafford Beer’s managerial cybernetics to the concept 
of freedom? The remainder of this paper is an attempt to do just this. 
Managerial cybernetics as designing freedom 
The first of our determinants of freedom is: 
… the one that is employed when we test a person’s freedom by his ability to 
satisfy his desires. So long as we confine ourselves to this criterion, it does not 
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matter what these desires are, or how they came to be acquired. All that is relevant 
is the degree to which they succeed in being satisfied. (Ayer 1990: 139) 
In the terms of the spielraum metaphor, this determinant ignores the influence of the 
other two determinants. The extent of the spielraum and how this was itself 
determined, has no influence on the ability to satisfy desires within the given 
spielraum. Hence this determinant fails to consider the factors that might be limiting 
the range of choice itself – it does not matter if these are self-selected or imposed 
from elsewhere. It is only the freedom to realize a particular choice that is considered. 
In Beer’s managerial cybernetics, the counterpart to this first determinant of freedom 
is Ross Ashby’s ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ (1964) and the various principles of 
management that Beer deduced from it (Beer 1979). The law is usually summarized in 
a simple statement: ‘only variety can destroy variety’ (Ashby 1964: 207). This simple 
statement summarizes the logical possibilities inherent in one defined system being 
able to counter the effects of another defined system. However, when looked at from 
another perspective, the law also summarizes the logical possibilities inherent in one 
defined system being able to freely achieve its desired outcomes within a defined set 
of possibilities. 
For instance, consider a conference delegate, D, who, at the mid-morning refreshment 
break, so to speak, desires a cup of tea. Similarly, at the conference lunch break, D 
desires a cup of coffee. Then the state of D, at the end of the conference, if these were 
her only desires, would be either satisfied or dissatisfied – depending on whether she 
was able to obtain a cup of tea and coffee according to her preferences. Which of 
these two states will prevail? This will depend upon the elements that constitute the 
supply of drinks R to the conference meeting and the ability of the delegate to 
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communicate her preferences to those elements. In particular, if R has a variety that is 
comprised of both tea and coffee and D has a communication channel capable of 
carrying the respective requests for tea and coffee to R, then the potential state within 
D called ‘dissatisfaction’ is destroyed; she obtains drinks according to her desires. She 
is free to choose.  
One of the principal concerns of Beer’s managerial cybernetics is the diagnosis of 
managed systems using the yardstick of requisite variety. Beer’s whole approach is 
acutely aware of this determinant of freedom. This provides an insight into why 
freedom is paradoxically in need of design. It also dissolves the paradox that ‘liberty 
is control’ (Adams 1971). 
Design is the clue. Humankind soon saw that it could not hope for the best in 
acquiring shelter, clothing, and food. It had to design tools and weapons. From that 
stage human kind was led by its technological nose to the moon.… En route we 
gave up designing for humankind, and designed for aggrandisement instead. (Beer 
1979: 92–93)3 
The cybersyn project, freedom and equality 
As noted above, this first determinant of freedom exhibits no interest, as such, in the 
possibility that desires may vary between individuals or in the extent of the desires 
themselves. This is reflected in the implication of Ashby’s law that ‘it is not a matter 
of counting possible states, but of matching them’ (Beer 1979: 89). But there are 
certain fundamental needs that it is difficult not to recognize as nearly universal: food, 
drink, housing, sex. As Bertrand Russell argued: 
                                                 
3
Similar conclusions have ben independently reached by others using very different 
arguments. For example, Fuller (1969). 
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Whatever else is involved in freedom, certainly no person is free who is deprived 
of anything in the above list, which constitutes the bare minimum of freedom. 
(Russell 1928: 171)  
Furthermore: 
… it is obvious that the minimum of freedom can be better secured in a society 
than by Robinson Crusoe; indeed sex and parenthood are essentially social.… 
Society diminishes the physical obstacles to freedom. (Russell 1928: 171–172)  
The fact that the first determinant of freedom fails to consider the extent of the desires 
that are being pursued brings it into conflict with the second determinant of freedom. 
As Ayer observes: 
… the effect of using the second criterion is to establish a positive correlation 
between the extent of the spielraum and the freedom its owner enjoys. (Ayer 1990: 
139–40) 
Given this second determinant of freedom, Werner Ulrich’s criticism of project 
Cybersyn seems much less sensible, for it is now no longer difficult to appreciate the 
emphasis that a political programme of democratic socialism places on industrial 
productivity. The political programme of the ‘Unidad Popular’ coalition was 
formulated to address the needs of a country in which they estimated a half a million 
families to be homeless, with as many again living in conditions without adequate 
sewage disposal, drinking water or light. A half of all children under fifteen were 
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estimated to be malnourished. In conjunction with this, 10 per cent of the population, 
together with foreign owned business concerns, consumed half the national income.
4
 
Ulrich’s criticism was that the ‘Cybersyn’ project ‘reflects mere tool design’, fails to 
consider ‘its own normative content’, and was a ‘missed opportunity for true 
democratisation of the workplace’ because ‘the workers are “helped” to be better tools 
of industrial production; that is all [emphasis added]’ (Ulrich 1981: 54–55). This 
criticism is based on a failure to acknowledge any potential relevance of the second 
determinant of freedom: the extent of the spielraum in which self-determination may 
be exercised. It is this dimension that most social and economic, as opposed to penal 
legislation, is designed to address (Ayer 1990). 
For instance, what weighting does Ulrich’s ethical qualms place upon the question of 
whether food ought to be available to the mass of a country’s population? What limits 
ought to be placed on a political system in which small minorities exercise their 
freedom at the expense of others? Is it illegitimate for a democratically elected 
government to attempt to address these issues using the tools of management 
cybernetics? As Bertrand Russell sarcastically put it: 
Advocates of capitalism are very apt to appeal to the sacred principles of liberty, 
which are all embodied in one maxim: the fortunate must not be restrained in the 
exercise of tyranny over the unfortunate [original emphasis]. (Russell 1928: 174)  
In Beer’s VSM, the counterpart to these considerations is that: 
                                                 
4
The Unidad Popular coalition consisted of several political parties that approved a 
programme of action in 1969. These estimates are presented in its published political 
programme (Allende 1973).  
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… liberty must be a computable function of effectiveness for any system whose 
objectives are known. (Beer 1979: 428) 
Managerial cybernetics and value freedom 
The second determinant of freedom leads to a consideration of the third determinant 
of freedom – the provenance of the spielraum. It is this consideration that underpins 
Werner Ulrich’s criticism (1981) of the VSM as a tool of ‘managerial fascism’, 
Adams’ summation (1973) of it with the slogan ‘l’etat c’est moi’, and Rivett’s 
question (1977) as to ‘who controls the controller’, etc. 
As Ayer observes: 
It … seems paradoxical to say that a man is free if his course of action clearly 
depends upon decisions that he did not take or material factors over which he has 
no control. To return to the example of the scientifically planned society, the 
reason for judging as, surely, nearly everyone would, that its members would not 
be free, is that … the pattern of their lives would have been antecedently 
determined, even though they might not be aware of it themselves. If we 
considered the first two criteria, we should allow that members of such a society 
enjoyed a high degree of freedom; for, if the planning was successful, their 
spielraum might be both extensive and unencumbered. It is the influence of this 
third criterion that turns the scale. (Ayer 1990: 141) 
In Beer’s managerial cybernetics, the counterpart to these considerations is that: 
When we speak of management and its decisions we are really speaking of the 
settling of belief.… To study what really happens we need to consider the account 
 - 21 - 
given of this process by men who have made a special study of how it works – the 
philosophers and psychologists. (Beer 1966: 16) 
In ‘Decision and Control’, Beer assembled an analysis of the ‘fixing of belief’ and 
acknowledges it to be inspired by the pragmatic philosopher, C. S. Pierce (2000). In a 
thumbnail sketch, Pierce proposed that belief is fixed by four methods and Beer uses 
them to discuss how management may be conducted. The method of tenacity uses the 
process of conditioning. The method of authority hinges on an individual’s 
subservience to a system of which (s)he forms a mere part. The method of apriority is 
one in which beliefs are fixed by the axioms of the language through which they are 
discussed. Finally, there is the method of science that Beer championed. 
Beer always regarded the VSM as a scientific model: a rigorous description of what 
makes any system viable. In his modelling epistemology, viable systems, when 
represented by the VSM, share structural relationships that are invariant with that 
present in the neuro-physiology of the human body – there is an isomorphism. For 
Beer, these represented the ‘Laws of Viability’. Now whether one accepts Beer’s 
position is determined by the philosophy of science that one adopts. For instance, it is 
hard to imagine how a viable system model of a social organization (as opposed to a 
human body) might be refuted by empirical observation because any putative viable 
social system will have so many conditions of existence attached to it. It follows that 
the required isomorphism – from the model to the relevant empirical theorems of 
regulation in the human body – may be left undemonstrated (Rudner 1966). 
Be that as it may, science has an interest in natural laws – regularities in nature. This 
is quite distinct from normative laws – legal enactments or normative commandments 
that are enforced by men. It follows that if there is a class of viable systems that is 
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capable of being understood by science, they are not constructed in terms of man-
made normative laws. In other words, the VSM is value-free; the model itself can’t be 
held to account for the regulatory uses to which it might be put. 
Given this division, the role of managerial cybernetics in governance might be 
summarized, in the most unscientific of English, as follows: 
All I can do is share an experience. All I can say is that is how it was. Here are 
various approaches to various issues.… Somewhere in all of this is the 
metamessage to do with insight and to do with hope [emphasis added]. Naturally I 
hope you got the message and maybe learned a new skill but a not a new creed 
[emphasis added]. (Beer 1975a: 456) 
Where does this leave Werner Ulrich’s charge that knowledge and will are 
inseparably intertwined, that this fact cannot be ignored, and a new critically 
normative ‘systems paradigm’ is thereby required? One response is that: 
… the sociology of knowledge hopes to reform the social sciences by making the 
social sciences aware of the social forces and ideologies which unconsciously beset 
them. But the main trouble about prejudices is that there is no such direct way of 
getting rid of them. For how shall we ever know that we have made any progress in 
our attempt to rid ourselves from prejudice?… Self analysis is no substitute for 
those practical actions which are necessary for establishing the democratic 
institutions which alone can guarantee the freedom of critical thought and the 
progress of science. (Popper 1957: 222–23) 
Our analysis suggests that in order to decide whether the particular use of the VSM in 
Salvador Allende’s Chile was inimical to human freedom, one must conduct an 
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analysis across all three of the criteria relevant to the concept of freedom and 
somehow pass a personal judgement. Nevertheless, whilst Beer’s discussions of 
managerial cybernetics have been shown to be sensitive to the three criteria – this 
does not appear to be the case for his critics. 
Can any judgment be passed on whether the leadership of the Chilean government 
that applied the Viable System Model to the social economy was itself hostile to 
political freedom or democracy? Our analysis suggests that one must step outside of 
Beer’s writings on management cybernetics to pass a normative judgement. One 
might base one’s judgement on criteria advanced in the political philosophy of Karl 
Popper. Popper held the view that by expressing the central problem of politics in the 
form ‘Who should rule?’ – a formulation that Popper traced to Plato’s Republic – a 
lasting confusion was created in political philosophy (Popper 1966). Popper argued 
that any possible answer to this is quite useless because of the ‘paradox of freedom’: 
‘what if it is the will of the people that they should not rule, but a tyrant instead?’ 
(Popper 1966: 123) 
Popper argued that what political thought should face from the onset is the prospect of 
bad governance. Hence: 
… This leads to a new approach to the problem of politics, for it forces us to 
replace the question ‘who should rule?’ by the new question: how can we so 
organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from 
doing too much damage? (Popper 1966: 121) 
The result of this re-formulation is that: 
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A state is politically free if its institutions enable its citizens in practice to change a 
government without bloodshed when a majority wishes such a change. (Popper 
1999: 89) 
It follows that by this criterion a man who believes in freedom is not bound by the 
decisions of either the minority or the majority – if those decisions intend to dismantle 
the institutions of democracy. He is free to fight tyranny and the paradox of freedom 
is avoided. In this sense it is no longer paradoxical to say of a democracy: ‘l’etat c’est 
moi’. 
The history books suggest that Salvador Allende believed in the institutions of 
Chilean democracy and in the criterion of freedom as defined above. He sat in the 
Chilean senate from 1945 to 1970 and stood unsuccessfully for the Chilean 
Presidency in 1952, 1958 and 1964. In 1970, he was elected President at the head of a 
broadly based Popular Front Coalition. He died, reportedly in hand-to-hand fighting in 
the Presidential Palace, refusing to surrender his office, when elements of the Chilean 
armed forces overthrew his government and the Chilean constitution on 11 September 
1973 (MacEoin 1975). 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the sensitivity of Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model of 
organization to the concept of human freedom. It has found that the criticism made of 
the model, and managerial cybernetics more generally, fails to consider the complex 
ordinary language usage of the concept of ‘freedom’. Such usage suggests that there 
are at least three dimensions to human freedom that are of interest. These are logically 
independent of one another and, as such, severally applying them as criteria to assess 
a given case can give rise to puzzles and paradoxes. All three are found to have been 
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addressed and acknowledged within Beer’s writings but this is not so for his critics. 
Finally, a further criterion, formulated in political philosophy, has been used to judge 
whether the leadership of the Chilean government that applied the Viable System 
Model to the social economy was itself inclined to either promote a tyranny, or 
otherwise be hostile to political freedom or democracy. The application of the 
criterion suggests that they were not. 
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